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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Of the twenty largest public company bankruptcy filings from 1980 to 
the present, seventeen have taken place since 2001, and ten of those 
seventeen were filed between March of 2007 and August of 2009.
1
 One 
such example is In re Chrysler LLC, in which Chrysler, on April 30, 2009, 
filed for protection under Title 11 of the United States Code.
2
 For the 
twelve-month period ending on December 31, 2008, the Chrysler 
companies suffered a staggering $16.8 billion loss.
3
 The failure of such 
large companies and the distribution of their enormous wealth of assets 
have and will continue to have major repercussions.
4
 The Bankruptcy Code 
provides these massive businesses with different options for filing 
bankruptcy, and these options have reverberating economic and societal 
effects well beyond any one company‘s interests. It is thus essential to 
understand the options provided by the Bankruptcy Code and to ensure 
they provide for the most advantageous possible outcomes when America‘s 
foundational businesses collapse.  
While Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the traditional guide for 
corporate reorganization and the payment of creditors over time,
5
 
Chrysler—following the current corporate trend—chose to proceed 
pursuant to § 363.
6
 Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a 
Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, such as Chrysler, to ―use, sell, or lease‖ 
estate property outside the ordinary course of business.
7
 Section 363 sales 
tend to be cheaper and more time efficient than reorganization 
alternatives.
8
 Accordingly, in the last twenty-five years, § 363(b) asset 
sales have become standard practice in large corporate bankruptcies.
9
 
―Proponents of the Chapter 11 liquidation method into which § 363 has 
evolved extol the speed, efficiency, and competition involved in the sales 
as indications of its superiority over a more traditional reorganization.‖10 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 20 Largest Public Company Bankruptcy Filings 1980 — Present, 
BANKRUPTCYDATA.COM, http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/Largest_Overall_All-Time.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2011).  
 2. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 87–88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 3. Id. at 89. 
 4. Corporate Bankruptcy & the Wall Street Bailout, TOTALBANKRUPTCY.COM, 
http://www.totalbankruptcy.com/news/articles/miscellaneous/wall-street-bailout-and-corporate-
bankruptcies.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).  
 5. Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter11.html (last visited Feb. 20, 
2011).  
 6. 405 B.R. at 87.  
 7. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006). 
 8. George W. Kuney, Let’s Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale Process as an 
Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1273 (2004).  
 9. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 115 
(2d Cir. 2009).  
 10. Bryant P. Lee, Note, Chapter 18? Imagining Future Uses of 11 U.S.C. § 363 to 
Accomplish Chapter 7 Liquidation Goals in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 520, 530.  
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This trend toward use of § 363(b) is likely to grow as poor economic 
conditions continue to increase creditor control over reorganization and 
because of the lack of available financing to debtors, both of which tend to 
fuel § 363(b) sales.
11
 Thus, the ―side door‖ of § 363(b) may soon ―replace 
the main route of Chapter 11 reorganizations.‖12   
Considering current declining economic conditions, the massive 
amounts of wealth at stake, and the modern prevalence of § 363 sales in 
large-scale corporate bankruptcy proceedings, it is prudent to ensure that 
§ 363(b) provides a competent and just medium to protect the diverse 
interests of all relevant parties and society as a whole. While § 363 sales, 
on paper, appear to be the ideal way to maximize value for secured 
creditors, preserve the going concerns of businesses, and keep workers on 
the job,
13
 there is a well-founded fear that quick asset sales run the risk of 
circumventing the Chapter 11 process.
14
 In re Chrysler LLC highlights the 
concerns of courts and academics that § 363 fails to adequately protect the 
interests of companies‘ smaller debt and equity holders15 and ignores some 
of the fundamental bankruptcy principles and protections.  
Part II of this Note provides the basic framework of the Chrysler 
bankruptcy agreement for the purposes of analyzing § 363 and the business 
justification standard. Part III details the development of § 363(b) and three 
of the primary dangers that exist with § 363(b) asset sales under business 
justification analysis. Part III then uses the In re Chrysler LLC case to 
highlight the issues in practice. The first issue is § 363(b) sales‘ 
vulnerability to construction as ―sub rosa‖ sales, which serve the same 
purpose of reorganizations but avoid Chapter 11 protection requirements.
16
 
The second issue is § 363(b) sales‘ potential to allow powerful creditors 
too much influence and control, thereby subordinating and possibly 
defeating the protected interests of smaller creditors.
17
 The third issue is 
§ 363 sales‘exceedingly low return values for the assets sold off in spite of 
their intended purpose of maximizing decreasing values.
18
 Part IV 
addresses the current standard for approving § 363(b) sales, the business 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Id. at 531.  
 12. Jason Brege, Note, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV. 1639, 
1640 (2006).  
 13. Josef S. Athanas, Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales Attacked by Judges and Commentators 
Just as Economic Conditions Make Them More Important than Ever, in BANKRUPTCY AND 
RESTRUCTURING CHAPTER 11 STRATEGIES 2009, at 39, 56 (2009). 
 14. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 
1069–71 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 
106 MICH. L. REV 1, 1, 3 (2007).  
 15. E.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1069–71; see Brege, supra note 12, at 1643–44. 
 16. Cf. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 
F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 17. E.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1069–70; see also Lee, supra note 10, at 524.  
 18. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 123 (returning an estimated value of $2 billion for 
assets with a going concern value of approximately $25 billion); see also Lee, supra note 10, at 
524.  
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justification rule,
19
 and how the rule wrongly facilitates the approval of 
dubious asset sales. Part V discusses academic theories for reform of the 
current business judgment standard as well as its implementation in other 
areas of the law. Lastly, Part VI synthesizes the differing approaches to the 
business justification standard and offers a refined framework for assessing 
§ 363 asset sales.  
II.  HIGHLIGHTING THE PROBLEM: IN RE CHRYSLER 
On November 29, 2007, a $10 billion term loan maturing on August 2, 
2013, was made available to Chrysler as a First Lien Credit Agreement.
20
 
―Chrysler‘s obligations . . . [were] secured by a security interest in and first 
lien on substantially all of Chrysler‘s [then-$39.3 billion in] assets.‖21 On 
the date of filing, Chrysler owed the first-lien lenders approximately $6.9 
billion under the loan.
22
 Later, ―under a Second Lien Credit 
Agreement . . . Chrysler received a $2 billion term loan [maturing] on 
February 3, 2014[,]‖ from affiliates of Daimler and Cerberus.23 The loan 
agreement provided that the second-lien lenders had a second-priority 
security interest in the same assets that secured the First Lien Credit 
Agreement.
24
 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 established the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which allows the Secretary of the 
Treasury to buy troubled assets in order to restore economic confidence 
and to stimulate the economy.
25
 Chrysler borrowed $4 billion from the 
U.S. Treasury under TARP, securing the financing by granting the 
Treasury a first-priority lien on all unencumbered assets and a third-priority 
lien on all other assets as collateral under the first and second lien 
agreements.
26
 Chrysler ―also provided the U.S. Treasury with a separate 
promissory note in the amount of $267 million,‖ which, along with the $4 
billion TARP loan, matured no later than January 2, 2012.
27
 However, in 
order to secure the loan and the note, Chrysler was required to submit a 
plan to the government, its major creditor, showing a viable long-term 
solution.
28
 Chrysler entered into a term sheet for strategic alliance with 
Fiat, with whom it had been negotiating for some time prior to the issuance 
of the loan.
29
 This Fiat Viability plan was accepted by the U.S. Treasury, 
                                                                                                                     
 19. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1066, 1070; see also James Patrick Shea et al., Pushing 
the Limits of Section 363—Is Confirmation Obsolete in the Asset Sale Case?, 14 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 2 art. 2, at 7–8 (2005) (stating that the business justification standard is still the prevalent 
bankruptcy standard).  
 20. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211 (West 2011). 
 26. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 89–90. 
 27. Id. at 89.   
 28. Id. at 90. 
 29. Id.  
4
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but only after  Chrysler addressed certain governmental concerns.
30
  
To satisfy Fiat and the governmental TARP loan concerns, New CarCo 
Acquisition LLC (New Chrysler) was formed, and the parties created a 
new collective bargaining agreement with United Automobile Workers 
(UAW) to establish new wage structures and retirement settlement 
agreements.
31
 This included a voluntary employees‘ beneficiary association 
(VEBA) to fund health care obligations
32
. The agreement was funded by a 
55% equity interest in New Chrysler as well as a $4.59 billion note.
33
 
Ultimately, the final bankruptcy transaction agreement established that 
Chrysler would transfer (by § 363(b) sale) all of its operating assets to New 
Chrysler in exchange for $2 billion in cash and certain ―Old‖ Chrysler 
liabilities.
34
 Fiat would contribute technology, distribution, and cost saving 
capabilities to New Chrysler, and New Chrysler would issue relevant 
interest in the company as follows: 55% to the VEBA, 20% to Fiat, and 8% 
to the U.S. Treasury.
35
 Additionally, the Treasury agreed to provide 
financing relating to the sale transaction in the amount of $4.96 billion for 
60 days and $6 billion to support New Chrysler after the sale was 
completed.
36
 
The plaintiff in Chrysler, the ―Indiana Funds,‖37 filed an objection to 
the sale motion.
38
 ―Indiana Funds [held] approximately $42 million of the 
$6.9 billion in first priority secured claims . . . .‖39 The Indiana Funds 
argued that, under the § 363 agreement, the first-lien lenders‘ collateral 
would be stripped, and the first-lien lenders would receive twenty-nine 
cents on the dollar for their investment.
40
 The collateral would then be 
transferred to New Chrysler under the agreement. The plaintiffs believed 
that the transferred collateral, in the hands of New Chrysler, was worth 
significantly more than what the plaintiffs received as first-lien lenders.
41
 
Additionally, the Indiana Fund‘s and all other senior claims would be 
impaired in favor of the unsecured junior claims of the Government, 
VEBA, and UAW, all of which receive considerable value under the 
agreement.
42
 Lastly, the funds believed that Fiat should not receive a stake 
in New Chrysler without providing cash contributions in addition to the 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at 91. 
 31. Id. at 91–92. 
 32. Id. at 92. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 93. Collectively, Indiana State Teachers Retirement Fund, Indiana State Police 
Pension Trust, and Indiana Major Moves Construction comprise the ―Indiana Funds.‖ Id. 
 38. Id.   
 39. Id. (representing ―less than 1% of the first-lien debt‖).  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
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technological and distributional support provided.
43
 Put simply, as a small 
and relatively insignificant creditor, Indiana Funds believed its supposedly 
secured first-lien interest was wrongly losing out to the power and 
influence of junior, unsecured loan creditors under the court-sanctioned 
§ 363 restructuring. Right or wrong, the circumstances exposed the 
shortcomings and manipulability of § 363 asset sales.  
III.  SECTION 363 AND ITS DANGERS IN PRACTICE 
Section 363 asset sales have changed from what was originally 
intended by the code‘s drafters and the bankruptcy courts.44 Section 363(b) 
originated in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and permitted a sale of a debtor‘s 
assets when the estate or any part of the estate was ―of a perishable nature, 
or liable to deteriorate in value.‖45 Originally, § 363 transactions concerned 
only expedited sales that were imperative to preserve values that would 
rapidly diminish.
46
 Until the implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, approval of asset sales required sufficient showing of cause 
for circumventing standard Chapter 11 reorganization plans.
47
 However, 
recently there has been a movement away from the emergency and cause 
restrictions toward adopting more liberal standards for approving § 363 
sales.
48
 The traditional aversion to unrestricted use of § 363 sales,
49
 and the 
major decisions that restricted debtor‘s use of § 363 asset sales,50 have 
given way to the business judgment standard‘s very broad application by 
the courts.
51
 As evidenced in the Chrysler outcome, this broad standard is a 
tool with which the courts can permit sub rosa sales, creditor manipulation, 
and minimal realized asset values in § 363 sales, all of  which fall well 
short of standard bankruptcy protections.
52
 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Id.  
 44. Robert G. Sable, Michael J. Roeschenthaler & Daniel F. Blanks, When the 363 Sale Is the 
Best Route, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 art. 2, at 1 (2006).  
 45. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 25, 14 Stat 517, 528 (repealed 1878); see also Ind. State 
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 46. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 113. 
 47. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 
1067, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983).   
 48. See Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor 
Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 51 (1999) (permitting § 363 sales unless there is 
an obvious reason not to). 
 49. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 113; see also In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1067. 
 50. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 
F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (establishing that sub rosa plans will not be upheld); In re Solar Mfg. 
Corp., 176 F.2d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 1949) (stating that the sale of a debtor‘s assets outside of 
reorganization should be confined to emergencies where the assets will lose all value without 
immediate action).  
 51. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1066, 1070 (establishing the business justification 
standard); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
15th rev. ed. 2009) (stating that amongst the courts there are different thresholds for permitting the 
sale of assets outside a bankruptcy plan). 
 52. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
6
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A.  Sub Rosa Sales 
The concept of sub rosa (―below the line‖) plans first appeared in the 
case of In re Braniff Airways, Inc.
53
 In discussing the validity of an 
approved § 363 asset sale, the court said, ―[t]he debtor and the bankruptcy 
court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for 
confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan 
sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.‖54  Essentially, a § 363 plan is 
sub rosa if, similar to basic Chapter 11 procedures, the remaining plan for 
reorganization is predetermined according to the sale.
55
 The Braniff court 
held that in future attempts to establish appropriate terms for § 363 plans, 
parties and district courts ―must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.‖56 
It has been subsequently established that the rights of senior secured 
creditors cannot be abrogated in § 363 plans and that bankruptcy courts 
lack the authority to approve such transactions under § 363.
57
 However, 
while the Braniff holding provided the language that courts have 
subsequently used as guidance in sub rosa determinations,  the court did 
not explain the appropriate use or procedure of sub rosa objections, nor did 
it specify any direct limitation on the use of § 363 sales.
58
 Despite the very 
explicit determination by the courts that asset selling plans under § 363 
must not simply be for the purpose of evading the standards of Chapter 
11,
59
 through the lack of clarity in the business justification standard, these 
are precisely the type of asset sales courts have subsequently approved.
60
 In 
re Chrysler highlights this potential abuse.  
B.  Sub Rosa Approval in In re Chrysler 
Beyond the actual form of the sale, the Chrysler ―sale‖ implements 
everything that Chapter 11 plans are designed to accomplish without 
enforcing of any of Chapter 11‘s mandated protections.61 The § 363 sale 
                                                                                                                     
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 9 (2005) (supporting the argument that courts‘ liberal § 363 
standards have permitted unfathomably corrupt acts by large companies).  
 53. 700 F.2d at 940.  
 54. Id. 
 55. See Sloane, supra note 48, at 45.  
 56.  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 
700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983); see e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (disclosure requirements); 
id. § 1126 (voting); id. § 1129(a)(7) (best interest of creditors test); id. § 1129(b)(2)(B) 
(absolute priority rule). 
 57. Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 333 
B.R. 30, 49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
 58. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d at 940. 
 59. Id.; In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 333 B.R. at 52.  
 60. See, e.g., Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 
108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 491, 495–96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 61. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al. at 43, Ind. State Police 
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-2311-
bk).  
7
Korres: Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 Protections Thro
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
966 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
reorganizes the finances and obligations of the debtors and determines the 
handling of nearly all the creditors without disclosure requirements,
62
 
voting,
63
 the best interest of the creditors,
64
 or the priority rule
65
 being 
taken into account.
66
 Additionally, calling the transaction a sale is, in itself, 
construing the word sale in the most literal and narrow way possible. The 
proposed § 363 transaction is a sale only in name as the ―New Chrysler‖ 
established by the deal will operate exactly as the old Chrysler in every 
substantive way.
67
 The brand name ―Chrysler,‖68 headquarters,69 
employees, a majority of management,
70
 and lines of cars and trucks
71
 are 
essentially the same under New Chrysler. Thus, Chrysler evaded the 
procedural and substantive protections of Chapter 11 in reorganizing 
pursuant to the § 363 sale, and in doing so, it achieved a result that could 
not be reached through the standard Chapter 11 process.
72
 It is unlikely 
that, in a proper Chapter 11 reorganization plan, first-lien lenders would 
ever agree to accept value equal to roughly one third of their debt, unless 
absolutely no alternatives were available.
73
 However, Chrysler was able to 
sidestep this need for creditor approval by disguising the reorganization as 
a § 363(b) asset sale.
74
 Chrysler then based the remainder of the deal on 
this § 363(b) asset sale and hoped the court would not find it an 
unacceptable sub rosa plan. Using the ambiguity of the § 363 business 
justification standard, the court obliged.
75
  
C.  Influence of Creditors 
Another concern is that the Bankruptcy Court‘s understanding of 
adequate minor creditor protections potentially allows a powerful creditor 
to ―run roughshod‖ over the rights of lesser creditors.76 In addressing 
§ 363(b) asset sales, the In re Lionel court acknowledged the potential for 
                                                                                                                     
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 63. Id. § 1126. 
 64. Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
 65. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B). 
 66. See Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 
114 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 67. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al., supra note 61, at 44. 
 68. Id. (citing Chrysler Master Transaction Agreement § 5.19(b)). 
 69. Id. (citing Chrysler Master Transaction Agreement § 11.01).  
 70. Id. (citing Chrysler Master Transaction Agreement § 6.01). 
 71. Id. (citing Chrysler Master Transaction Agreement, Recitals ¶ 2).  
 72. See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
 73. In bankruptcy first-lien lenders are the first to be satisfied. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) 
(2006). Thus, first lien lenders would seek at least a value equivalent to the value of their interest 
unless it was clear there was no alternative.  
 74. Id. §§ 363(b), 1126.  
 75. See Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 
118–19 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 76. Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 333 
B.R. 30, 49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
8
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creditor influence in the proceedings.
77
 ―‗[T]he natural tendency of a 
debtor in distress [is] to pacify large creditors with whom the debtor would 
expect to do business, at the expense of small and scattered public 
investors.‘‖78 In placating these major creditors, debtors often enter into 
debtor-in-possession financial arrangements involving restrictive 
covenants that effectively give control to the creditor.
79
 This relationship 
becomes particularly important when there are insufficient assets to protect 
creditors‘ claims, and thus, creditors have more incentive to participate in 
reorganizations and sales.
80
 Additionally, lesser creditors such as junior 
secured creditors, unsecured creditors, trade creditors, and equity holders 
have little ability to oppose decisions once pushed through by more 
influential major creditors.
81
 Thus, the great danger is that highly invested 
creditors will use their influence to dictate favorable terms or prices for a § 
363(b) asset sale at the expense of junior or unsecured creditors who lack 
the ability to protect their own interests.
82
 It appears that the courts are 
aware of influential creditor dangers.
83
 However, courts have approved 
plans undeniably dominated by the major creditors behind them.
84
 Thus, it 
becomes clear that the inconsistent scrutiny of § 363 sales has allowed 
debtors to manipulate standard bankruptcy protections.
85
 Put simply, there 
is not an adequate standard to shield the system from unfair dealing and 
abuse.
86
 
D.  Creditor Manipulation in In re Chrysler  
In re Chrysler demonstrates that, alarmingly, courts can allow primary 
first-lien lenders to have their interests usurped by the influence of major 
creditors exerting influence in § 363(b) asset sales.
87
  In Chrysler, the U.S. 
Treasury Department (Treasury) represented ―(i) the Debtors‘ prepetition 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 
(2d Cir. 1983).  
 78. Id. at 1070 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, at 5796). 
 79. Lee, supra note 10, at 541–42. 
 80. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 
at 6 (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 321, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081661.  
 81. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 38–39.  
 82. See Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 
333 B.R. 30, 49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 83. See id. at 49–50; cf. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 
722 F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983).  
 84. See Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 
111–12 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a government-driven sale of Chrysler over the objections of first-
lien lenders); see also In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 473–74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(upholding government-driven sale over objections of lesser lien holders). 
 85. See supra notes 82–84.   
 86. Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(B): The Opportunity for Sweetheart 
Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 275 (2006). 
 87. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 111–12.  
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third-lien lender, (ii) the Debtor‘s [debtor in possession] lender, (iii) the 
exit finance lender, (iv) an equity holder in the purchaser, (v) a TARP 
lender to the Administrative Agent, . . . and (vi) a TARP lender to both 
Chrysler FinCo and GMAC.‖88 Thus, it is hardly surprising to find that 
Chrysler did not even participate in negotiations with its two most 
significant creditor groups.
89
 The debtor‘s own chief financial officer 
testified that the Treasury essentially took over all major business decisions 
and responsibilities.
90
 The Treasury even decided the time and venue for 
filing of Chapter 11.
91
 The level of involvement by the major creditor in 
this instance went well beyond influence; it was essentially direct control 
by the Treasury to get its preferred outcome at the expense of other 
lenders—in this case, the first-lien secured lenders. Unlikely as such an 
outcome would seem under standard bankruptcy protections, the §363 plan 
was approved through the business judgment loophole.
92
 
E.  Undervaluation of Assets 
While some approve of the use of § 363 and the asset market‘s ability 
to ―set efficient prices and ensure fair recoveries for all involved 
creditors,‖93 in depressed economic climates, ―[a]s liquidity vanishes, so 
too does the ability of potential purchasers to take advantage of any buying 
opportunity. Less competition for the same assets generally creates an 
expectation of a lower sale price . . . .‖94 Adequate information is often 
only offered to small groups of interested parties, making informed 
participation by outside parties extremely difficult and further reducing 
competition and expected returns.
95
 Thus, rushed sales in depressed 
markets may not generate bidders or value for encumbered assets, and as a 
result, companies may be unable to fully satisfy existing creditors or to 
move forward efficiently through reorganization.
96
. In 2007, a study 
compared the effects of § 363 sales and traditional Chapter 11 
reorganizations. Sixty companies were analyzed—half participated in 
§ 363 sales and half in Chapter 11 reorganizations.  Not surprisingly, the 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al., supra note 61, at 73. In late 
2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 established the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to buy troubled assets to restore 
economic confidence and stimulate the economy. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201, 5211 (2006). 
 89. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al., supra note 61, at 72. 
 90. Id. at 72–73. 
 91. Office of the Press Sec‘y, White House, Press Background Briefing on Auto Industry by 
Senior Administration Officials (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/background-briefing-auto-industry-4302009. 
 92. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 114, 
118–19 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 93. Lee, supra note 10, at 536 (citing Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of 
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV 751, 756 (2002)).  
 94. Id. at 537.  
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 225–26 (1977) (explaining the purpose for requiring adequate 
information with disclosure statements).  
 96. See Lee, supra note 10, at 535–37 (discussing undervaluation dangers in § 363 sales).  
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study concluded that, though the costs were roughly the same, the § 363 
sales were significantly worse for creditors.
97
 The reorganizations had a re-
start value averaging 80% of the book value of prior assets versus only 
35% of book value for the sale price of assets in § 363 sales.
98
  Section 
363(b) sales enable businesses to quickly take advantage of immediate and 
fleeting opportunities to increase or maintain the value of assets.
99
 
However, statistics clearly suggest that the companies and their creditors 
are in fact getting just the opposite.
100
  One of the primary motivations 
behind a § 363(b) sale, the expedited sale of assets to preserve value, is in 
fact what hinders the ability to maximize that value in depressed 
economies.
101
  
F.  Diminished Values in In re Chrysler 
In the Chrysler proceedings, the bankruptcy court established 
procedures for submitting bids for assets in less than two weeks.
102
  
―Debtors also admitted that the bidding procedures were not likely to 
produce bids for such a large complicated transaction in such a short period 
of time.‖103 Subsequently, though Chrysler‘s assets had a going concern 
value of roughly $25 billion, the § 363 sale distribution to the first-lien 
lenders was calculated on the basis of a $2 billion dollar liquidation 
analysis.
104
 Although this is a staggering discrepancy in valuation, statistics 
show that such undervaluations are the norm, rather than the exception, in 
§ 363 sales.
105
 Regardless, courts continue to allow § 363 proceedings, 
which deprive assets, companies, and creditors of their value.
106
 These 
staggering outcomes are made possible on account of bankruptcy courts‘ 
firmly established, easily manipulable § 363 business judgment 
standard.
107
 
In examining these issues, bankruptcy courts clearly recognize the 
potential dangers of § 363 asset sales to the integrity of the system.
108
 
                                                                                                                     
 97. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3–4.  
 98. Id.  
 99. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 
1069 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 100. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3–4.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al., supra note 61, at 14. 
 103. Id. at 14–15. 
 104. Id. at 10, 12; In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 105. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
 106. See, e.g., In re Torch Offshore, Inc., 327 B.R 254, 261 (E.D. La. 2005). 
 107. See Rose, supra note 86, at 275–77 (discussing the manipulation of the business 
justification standard).  
 108. See, e.g., Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (establishing the business justification standard);  Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(recognizing that an overbroad application of § 363(b) would circumvent the intent of Chapter 11); 
Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 333 B.R. 30, 
51–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (recognizing limits on § 363(b) authority to alter creditors‘ lien rights and 
11
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Despite all of this evidence, the Second Circuit in Chrysler held that the 
approval of the § 363(b) sale by the bankruptcy court was not improper.
109
 
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated its temporary stay of the sale.
110
 
However, in doing so, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits of 
the case, and the major issues that arise under § 363 sales have yet to be 
conclusively resolved.
111
 The Chrysler case unmistakably represents the 
manifestation of major dangers in § 363(b) plans and, more importantly, 
the ability under the business justification standard to approve questionable 
asset sales under § 363(b). The issues raised by Chrysler represent an 
opportunity for the courts to address a major flaw in § 363(b) application, 
the business justification standard. The current application is simply too 
manipulable and discretionary to provide adequate protection against the 
vulnerabilities of § 363 abuse. 
IV.  THE PERMISSIVE STANDARD: BUSINESS JUSTIFICATIONS AND § 363 
SALE APPROVALS 
Bankruptcy courts have long recognized the need to refine the 
requirements for § 363 asset sales.
112
 But it was not until In re Lionel, that 
a definitive, non-emergency standard for approval was introduced.
 113
 This 
standard, the business justification test remains the leading standard for 
evaluating § 363 asset sales.
114
  
A.  The Original Business Justification Standard 
The Second Circuit in In re Lionel correctly pointed out that, read 
literally, § 363(b) seems to permit the sale of any property of the estate of a 
corporate debtor without any regard for the safeguards of the Bankruptcy 
Code.
115
 Yet, while the court did note that such a reading would be a 
violation of the congressional scheme for reorganizations
116
 and declined 
to extend ―carte blanche‖ to the bankruptcy judges in their assessments,117 
it created a malleable standard for assessing § 363(b) sales.  
―To balance the competing concerns of efficiency against the 
safeguards of the Chapter 11 process,‖ In re Lionel required ―a good 
                                                                                                                     
finding limits to prevent circumvention of Chapter 11). 
 109. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 
118–19 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 110. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (2009).  
 111. Id. at 2276–77.  
 112. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (noting that 
courts are split on the permissible scope of sales under § 363(b)). ―[T]o endow section 363 with the 
purpose of or a potential for a total reorganization would nullify, at debtor‘s option, the major 
protections and standards of chapter 11 of the Code.‖ Id. at 590.  
 113. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the view that § 363(b) 
requires an emergency situation). 
 114. Rose, supra note 86, at 268.  
 115. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1069.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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business reason‖ for approval of a § 363(b) transaction.118 In providing 
guidance on how to determine what constitutes sufficient business 
justification, the court suggested a series of factors:  
[A bankruptcy judge] should consider all salient factors 
pertaining to the proceeding and, accordingly, act to further 
the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity 
holders, alike. [A bankruptcy judge] might for example, look 
to such relevant factors as the proportionate value of the asset 
to the estate as a whole, the amount of elapsed time since the 
filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will be 
proposed and confirmed in the near future, the effect of the 
proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the 
proceeds to be obtained from the disposition vis-a-vis any 
appraisals of the property, which of the alternatives of use, 
sale or lease the proposal envisions and, most importantly 
perhaps, whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in 
value. This list is not intended to be exclusive, but merely to 
provide guidance to the bankruptcy judge.
119
  
While these factors represent an attempt at establishing a process of 
review for bankruptcy judges, the business justification standard does not 
seem to include any safeguards against the concerns that prompted its 
formation in the first place.
120
  In In re Lionel, the standard was initially 
used to deny a § 363 sale but the standard has subsequently been the 
rationale behind an increased number of sale approvals.
121
 Courts have 
applied the standard inconsistently, relying on In re Lionel and other early 
business justification cases only for factual comparisons.
122
 Thus, the 
business justification analysis established in In re Lionel has proven to be a 
discretionary and loose attempt at a standard, which does not provide a 
significant degree of guidance to debtors and creditors as they approach the 
§ 363 sale process.
123
  
B.  The Refined Standard 
Because of the broad and variable application of the business 
justification standard, the bankruptcy courts have subsequently attempted 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 114 
(2d Cir. 2009).  
 119. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1071.  
 120. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122–29 (2006) (regulating disclosure, solicitation, acceptance, and 
confirmation of plans). 
 121. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1654; Daniel M. Glosband, Pathology of Section 363 Sales: 
Not as Simple as They Look, 7 J. PRIV. EQUITY No. 4, at 60 (2004).  
 122. Sloane, supra note 48, at 48, 51–53; see also Stephens Indus. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386, 
390 (6th Cir. 1986) (overruling the emergency rule in the Sixth Circuit and establishing the 
business justification standard as the majority approach); In re Rausch Mfg. Co., 59 B.R. 501, 503 
(Bankr. D. Minn, 1985).  
 123. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 51, at ¶ 1129.01[2].  
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to increase justification scrutiny.
124
 In approving sales, judges have started 
considering new factors, including the requirement of good faith in sale 
proposals,
125
 dispositions that are ―fair and expeditious,‖126 and many 
others. However, as with the original factors set out in the In re Lionel 
standard, the newer factors and their supposed increased scrutiny are 
interpreted as merely non-determinative considerations in case-specific 
inquiries.
127
 Accordingly, scholars opine that these factors are simply 
flexible additions to an already flexible standard.
128
 In determining the 
meaning and scope of terms such as ―good faith‖ or ―fair,‖ courts have 
simply relied on the sound business justification analysis.
129
 ―All of these 
refinements have been added to the business justification standard in a 
haphazard way, such that it is no longer clear which factors determine 
whether a sale is permissible or how all of these factors relate to the actual 
efficiency of a given sale.‖130 Thus, in spite of attempts to refine the 
business justification standard, it essentially remains the same discretionary 
and broad method for reviewing § 363(b) sales.
131
 Applied to the dangers 
of sub rosa sales, creditor influence, the under valuation of assets, and 
additional aspects of the § 363 sale process not discussed in this Note,
132
 it 
becomes abundantly clear that loose business judgment standards can be 
manipulated to obtain approval for § 363 sales that fall short of traditional 
bankruptcy protections. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 124. E.g., In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 169–70 (3d Cir. 1999); Mission Iowa Wind 
Co. v. Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 125. In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 126. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).  
 127. See, e.g, Solow v. PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc. (In re PPI Enters.), 324 F.3d 197, 211 n.22 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (―[C]ourts have not identified with any consistency which circumstances of the debtor‘s 
filing are indicia of good faith.‖). 
 128. Rachael M. Jackson, Survey, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a Post-
Enron World: Trusting the Bankruptcy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 451, 493–94 (noting the aversion of bankruptcy courts to limiting judges‘ discretion).   
 129. See In re Condere Corp., 228 B.R. 615, 631, 636 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998).  
 130. Brege, supra note 12, at 1654.  
 131. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 
116–17 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 132. The subject is discussed elsewhere.  
[T]he Business Judgment rule ought to be inapplicable to break up-fees in 
bankruptcy cases. The complications of bankruptcy require the courts to conduct a 
more thorough detailed analysis for every case. Thus, a new uniform and detailed 
standard, with higher scrutiny than the judicial deference to the Business 
Judgment Rule, is needed to give guidance to courts . . . .  
Andrew S. Brown, Note, Breaking Up and Making Out (Rich): Recommendations for Revision of 
Bankruptcy Code Provisions Governing Break-Up Fees Used by Stalking Horse Bidders in § 363 
Bankruptcy Asset Sales, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (2010). 
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C.  Finding Justification for § 363 Manipulations  
The inconsistent business justification scrutiny afforded § 363 sales 
and aggressive use of § 363 by debtors have left the current standard 
unable to sufficiently shield the bankruptcy system from unfair dealing and 
abuse.
133
 Faced with manipulated and improper § 363 sales, courts permit 
such sales to prevent eminent worse alternatives such as total collapse of 
the business.
134
 This happens because the business justifications presented 
by the bankruptcy courts generally center around the savings of time or 
money.
135
 Consequently, parties can manipulate the courts‘ application of 
business justification by creating immediate necessity, which often serves 
as an overriding factor when weighing the potential misuses of § 363 
sales.
136
 Thus, the business justification standard provides a discretionary 
loophole through which the courts sanction sub rosa reorganization, 
creditor manipulation, extreme under valuation, and countless other 
characteristics contrary to bankruptcy principles.  
1.  Justifying Sub Rosa Sales 
In re Braniff established the impermissibility of sales that use § 363 to 
achieve reorganization without standard Chapter 11 protections.
137
 
Subsequently, analysis of whether a plan is sub rosa has developed into a 
simple business judgment analysis.
138
 In approaching the sub rosa analysis, 
courts have distorted the Braniff standard into a self-serving rationale:  
The term ―sub rosa‖ is something of a misnomer. It 
bespeaks a covert or secret activity, whereas secrecy has 
nothing to do with a § 363 transaction. Transactions blessed 
by the bankruptcy courts are openly presented, considered, 
approved, and implemented. Braniff seems to have used ―sub 
rosa‖ to describe transactions that treat the requirements of 
the Bankruptcy Code as something to be evaded or subverted. 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Rose, supra note 86, at 275. 
 134. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 2001 WL 1820326, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 
2, 2001) (stating in approval of a § 363 sale, ―TWA had no other strategic transaction available to it 
and had no other offer for value to which it could turn.‖); In re Brookfield Clothes, Inc., 31 B.R. 
978, 986 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating as justification for plan approval, ―[t]he absence of any 
means on the part of the debtor to return the business to operation‖). 
 135. William T. Bodoh, John W. Kennedy & Joseph P. Mulligan, The Parameters of the Non-
Plan Liquidating Chapter Eleven: Refining the Lionel Standard, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 7 (1992).  
 136. Id. at 7, 9–10.    
 137. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 
F.2d 935, 939–40 (5th Cir. 1983).  
 138. See, e.g., Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 
108, 117 (2d Cir. 2009) (―[A] bankruptcy court confronted with [a sub rosa] allegation may 
approve or disapprove a § 363(b) transfer that is a sale of all or substantially all of a debtor‘s assets, 
using the analysis set forth in Lionel in order to determine whether there was a good business reason 
for the sale.‖); In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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But even in that sense, the term is unhelpful.
139
 
Reworded, this explanation suggests that the court‘s position is that if a 
plan is approved, then it is not a sub rosa plan because it was openly 
presented and considered by the court prior to approval. Basically, a court‘s 
approval of a § 363 sale effectively precludes the possibility that the plan is 
an impermissible sub rosa sale only because the courts approval indicates 
that it is not. Furthermore, as approval of such plans will be based on the 
business justification standard, courts can approve sub rosa sales with the 
justification that there is no superior alternative, and then use the approval 
as the evidence that the sale is not sub rosa.
140
 This circular logic is 
centered on the ability to approve § 363 sales with the business 
justification standard. It is clearly the key component for manipulating a 
bankruptcy court into approving sub rosa sales. Given the courts‘ aversion 
to letting businesses collapse entirely and the broad scope of justifications 
used to prevent this from happening, it is clear that, through the application 
of business justification by the courts, § 363 sales are extremely vulnerable 
to sub rosa manipulation and abuse.  
2.  Justifying Creditor Manipulation 
Creditor influence in § 363 asset sales is not necessarily an 
unacceptable characteristic which taints the bankruptcy process.
141
 
However, creditor influence and control do become an issue when 
powerful creditors, for their own purposes, dictate sales that do not 
adequately or appropriately serve the interests of other less influential 
parties to the transaction.
142
 This issue becomes a problem when the 
business justification standard allows such manipulation to happen.
143
 
Although the In re Lionel court found that the appeasement of major 
creditors did not amount to a good business justification,
144
 the 
considerable deference given to saving time and money gives creditors the 
ability to dictate § 363 plans and outcomes.
145
 As businesses struggle or 
approach failure, they have the ability to manufacture an emergency by 
delaying bankruptcy filings until the last possible moment.
146
 Large, highly 
vested creditors are invariably involved in the bankruptcy and 
reorganization processes to protect their interests and investments.
147
 Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
 139. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 117. 
 140. See id. at 117–19. 
 141. Lee, supra note 10, at 550.  
 142. See id. at 548–50. 
 143. E.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 119 (approving a plan in which first-lien lenders 
received $6 billion less than the value of their debt while the major creditor, the U.S. Treasury, 
received substantial considerations as well).  
 144. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 
1070–72 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 145. See, e.g., Bodoh, Kennedy & Mulligan, supra note 135, at 7.  
 146. There is no rule requiring businesses to file for bankruptcy; they are free to file or fight to 
preserve the business at their discretion. 
 147. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 14 (4th ed. 2006).  
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/4
2011] BANKRUPTING BANKRUPTCY 975 
 
large influential creditors can influence the manufacture of debtor 
emergencies in an attempt to restrict the court‘s ability to deny § 363 
sales.
148
 The immediate need to keep a business operating as a going 
concern provides the courts‘ business justification for allowing debtors and 
major creditors to push through their own pet deals. The lack of required 
notice,
149
 the burden for objections,
150
 and the courts‘ reluctance to 
disallow approved plans,
151
 all generally deny remaining dissatisfied 
creditors the ability to do anything about it.  
3.  Justifying Meager Sale Values 
As previously stated, the primary objective of business reorganization 
in bankruptcy has always been to preserve the value of debtor‘s assets as a 
going concern.
152
 In regard to preserving value in § 363 sales, courts have 
held that one of the overriding goals is to maximize rather than restrict 
bidding.
153
 In justifying values obtained in § 363 sales, the courts have 
afforded much deference to the sales‘ open market bidding practices.154 
However, this business justification wrongly presupposes the openness and 
competition on the market.
155
 Markets cannot assess deal protection fees, 
credit bidding, and the disparity in available information.
156
 The debtor‘s 
power to restrict participants in open auctions makes the market exposure 
standard insufficient as an objective standard.
157
 These factors, coupled 
with the expedited nature of § 363 sales, hinder true and informed open 
competition and hamper the market‘s ability to return full or competitive 
value for assets. Thus, while the bankruptcy code is intended to provide a 
way for creditors to receive the greatest possible recovery,
158
 through 
business justification, the courts are approving § 363 sales that return 
values inherently contrary to this recovery principle.
159
 Under the old § 363 
standard of strict emergency and perishable goods, these low values may 
have been unavoidable and justifiable.
160
 However, the changed nature of 
                                                                                                                     
 148. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 149. Contra In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988). 
 150. See Institutional Creditors of Cont‘l Air Lines v. Cont‘l Air Lines, Inc., (In re Cont‘l Air 
Lines), 780 F.2d 1223, 1227–28 (5th Cir. 1986).  
 151. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 40. (―[W]e know of no modern case in which a 
large public company debtor proposed a sale and the court refused to approve it.‖). 
 152. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513. 527–28 (1984). 
 153. E.g., In re Beck Indus., Inc., 605 F.2d 624, 637 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Ohio Corrugating 
Co., 59 B.R. 11, 13 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).  
 154. E.g., In re Torch Offshore, Inc., 327 B.R. 254, 258 (E.D. La. 2005) (expressing 
satisfaction with the returned value for assets after an auction producing multiple bids in less than 
one day).  
 155. See Rose, supra note 86, at 282–83. 
 156. Id. at 282. 
 157. Id.  
 158. BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 1–3 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the function of bankruptcy law). 
 159. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
 160. Brege, supra note 12, at 1650–51. 
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§ 363 and its application dictates that courts‘ must reform or reassess 
entrenched business justification rationale or risk continually approving a 
valuation processes contrary to fundamental bankruptcy principles.  
There is no question that the business justification standard and its 
case-by-case factorial analysis has enabled the approval of extremely 
questionable § 363 asset sales.
161
 While, in the past, the business judgment 
standard may have served the courts‘ purposes and traditional bankruptcy 
standards, ―now that Section 363(b) sales have become ubiquitous, it is 
worth investigating whether this choice remains optimal . . . .‖162 In 
upholding the business judgment standard, even the bankruptcy courts 
have recognized the difficulties it presents.
163
 In light of these difficulties 
and the growing prevalence of § 363(b) sales, the shortcomings of the 
business judgment standard must be addressed in order to preserve the 
fundamental principles of bankruptcy protection. 
While this Note does not seek to address the level of integrity of the 
bankruptcy court system, it must also be mentioned that some academics 
suggest that § 363 sales result in poor recoveries because of corruption and 
self-dealing within the courts.
164
 Although this argument may be a ―giant 
blind leap,‖165 this argument highlights potential holes in the system that, 
at some point, must be addressed.
166
 
V.  IMPROVING THE CURRENT STANDARD 
There are plenty of scholarly approaches to refining the bankruptcy 
business judgment standard, all of which have yet to be adopted by the 
courts.
167
 However, there are two approaches in particular that, though 
limited individually, can together form the foundation of a framework for a 
better business judgment standard. Jason Brege, now a North Carolina 
attorney, suggests a strict efficiency based rule that removes discretion and 
ambiguity from the § 363(b) approval process.
168
 Commentator Elizabeth 
Rose, on the other hand, suggests procedural adjustments to allow 
objecting parties access to more information while still preserving courts‘ 
discretion throughout the process.
169
 While both approaches may prove 
functional in some circumstances, each has limitations that prevent it from 
being the ideal solution.  Interestingly, in scholars‘ and the courts‘ 
approach to implementing the business judgment standard, neither has 
                                                                                                                     
 161. See supra Part III. 
 162. Brege, supra note 12, at 1652. 
 163. See, e.g., Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 
108, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2009) (―As §363(b) sales proliferate, the competing concerns identified in 
Lionel have become harder to manage.‖). 
 164. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 39–41 (arguing that competition among courts for 
cases causes judges to blindly approve sales by debtors).  
 165. Athanas, supra note 13, at 48.  
 166. Lee, supra note 10, at 541.  
 167. E.g., Brege, supra note 12, at 1642; Rose, supra note 86, at 251. 
 168. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1658–59, 1673.  
 169. See Rose, supra note 86, at 283–84. 
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made significant use or mention of the application of the corporate 
business judgment standard.
170
 Taking certain corporate business judgment 
principles into account, along with both the Brege and Rose approaches to 
the bankruptcy rule, this Note offers an alternative, compromising 
approach to the business justification standard.   
A.  Strict § 363 Sales: The Efficiency-Based Rule 
Brege centers his rule-based analysis on the principle that § 363(b) 
sales must be approved only when they are efficient.
171
 Brege describes 
efficiency as, ―when the total value of the sale is greater than the value that 
would have been recovered through reorganization plus the transaction cost 
waste incurred in promulgating the sale.‖172 For Brege, the value of the sale 
is the present value received for the sold asset, the value through 
reorganization is the expected present value of the asset under a 
reorganization pathway, and the transaction cost waste is the costs involved 
in selling the asset under § 363(b).
173
 He also accurately points out that 
inherent in the costs of transactions is the previously mentioned danger of 
over-influence by major creditors.
174
  Although such costs are the most 
difficult of the factors to calculate or predict, under Brege‘s rule, this cost 
and creditor issue is theoretically moot if the value received in the § 363 
sale is higher than by any other means.
175
 Brege also undertakes a step-by-
step analysis of his formula and how it either addresses or negates all of the 
factors for consideration under the current business judgment analysis.
176
 
However, while efficiency is ideal and should be the goal of any 
§ 363(b) sale, Brege‘s strict analysis fails to account for the mitigating 
circumstances and fact-specific characteristics of individual bankruptcy 
filings. Nowhere does the analysis take into account the possibility that, 
though inefficient under this formula, a § 363(b) sale may be necessary to 
allow a business to continue operation. If the value received under § 363 
sale would not be as high as under reorganization, then the inefficient plan 
would fail. However, the Brege approach ignores the likely collapse of a 
company that needed the proceeds from such an inefficient sale to continue 
operations. Courts adopting this strict standard run the risk of denying 
businesses the ability to continue operating. Such a standard would 
wrongly ―straightjacket the bankruptcy judge so as to prevent him from 
doing what is best for the estate.‖177 Given the trend in the size and 
                                                                                                                     
 170. In all the research done for this Note, not once in any court case or scholarly work was the 
corporate business judgment standard referenced in relation to bankruptcy courts‘ interpretation and 
implementation of the same rule.  
 171. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1659. 
 172. Id. (stating efficiency = V sale > E reorganization + W sale) For an in-depth breakdown 
on how each of these factors is calculated, see id. at 1659–73. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1669. 
 175. Id. at 1670–71.  
 176. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1673–79. 
 177. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 
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relevance of the businesses recently attempting § 363(b) asset sales and the 
danger of denying such businesses the ability to continue, this strict rule 
must be limited in its application to have any place in the business 
justification analysis.
178
 The best use of the Brege approach is as a bright-
line standard or analysis to be used by courts or debtors to refute frivolous 
or unfounded objections by creditors to § 363 sales. Thus, any efficient 
plan under the Brege model would be easily approvable by the courts as the 
most valuable and desirable outcome under the circumstances. However, 
inefficient plans should not be disposed of right away as Brege suggests 
and as public policy prohibits.  Inefficient plans may still be necessary and 
are, therefore, in need of further consideration by the courts.  
B.  Informed § 363 Sales: Procedural Improvements  
In her attempts to refine the business justification rule, Rose offers 
procedurally based improvements as a solution.
179
 Her goal is to create 
more transparent, supervised, and thus, less vulnerable § 363 sales.
180
 Rose 
argues that this can be accomplished in two ways.
181
 The first is that 
objectors to sales have the option to extend the notice period for cause 
shown, with a low showing standard on account of objectors‘ time and 
informational disadvantage.
182
 The second is ―a tiered system for debtor 
disclosure requirements.‖183 Under Rose‘s approach, non-suspect sales 
need only conform to current notice and hearing requirements, while courts 
should consider heightened requirements for good faith creditor 
objections.
184
 The requests for additional disclosure would still be at the 
discretion of the courts, which would assess the reasonableness by 
performing a cost-benefit analysis between the debtor and objecting 
party.
185
 The courts could then, if they chose, require formal disclosure 
statements in conformity with standard Chapter 11 adequate information 
standards.
186
 
Although it does greatly increase the potential flow of information 
between all of the parties, better enables them to make informed and fair 
decisions, and preserves some of the courts‘ discretionary authority, Rose‘s 
                                                                                                                     
(2d Cir. 1983). 
 178. See U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980–2009, AM. BANKR. INST., http://www.abiworld.org/ 
AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID 
=57826 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (showing the total number of businesses filing for bankruptcy 
increased considerably between 2006 and 2008); see also Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. 
Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that in the last 
twenty-five years, § 363(b) asset sales have become standard practice in large corporate 
bankruptcies). 
 179. See Rose, supra note 86, at 283–84.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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approach does not appear to take into account the considerable delays it 
may create. Lesser-preferred creditors that do not receive the full value of 
their interest and have limited access to information would likely make 
ignorant yet good faith objections even if a proposed plan was the best 
possible outcome. Easily attainable extension of the notice period on these 
grounds, followed potentially by multiple disclosure hearings and 
requirements, considerably lengthen the § 363 plan process. Rose, herself, 
recognized that additional requirements and more rigid standards 
effectively eliminate the advantages of § 363 sales.
187
 Rose‘s framework 
for notice and disclosure appears extremely vulnerable to misuse and abuse 
by dissatisfied creditors hoping to stall out or defeat § 363 processes.  In 
order to increase available information and fairness, as Rose suggests, 
while still preserving the effectiveness of the § 363 sale, a base line 
standard or rule must exist to protect the system from imposing excessive 
and efficiency-defeating requirements.  
The Brege approach could provide the needed base line standard with 
which to protect Rose‘s procedural safeguards from abuse. Sufficient 
showing of cause for extended notice and disclosure requirements could be 
determined by Brege‘s efficiency analysis. A Brege efficient plan would 
defeat creditors‘ objections and would rapidly direct the sale toward 
approval. On the other hand, an inefficient plan under the Brege standard 
should serve as caution to the courts in regards to the sale. Inefficiency 
would thus constitute sufficient cause for an increased notice period or 
grounds for a determination as to expanded disclosure requirements. 
Ultimately, however, the determination for expanded disclosure or later on, 
approval as a whole, would come down to the same business justification 
analysis. It is at this point that the application of corporate business 
judgment principles provides a good deal of guidance.  
C.  The Other Standard: The Corporate Business Judgment Rule 
While an in-depth analysis of the corporate business judgment rule is 
beyond the scope of this Note, a glance at its principles and limitations 
offers some insight into potential improvements of the equivalent 
bankruptcy standard. The corporate business judgment rule is, in effect, the 
presumption by courts that directors making non-self-interested business 
decisions act in good faith and with due care.
188
 The policy reasons for the 
corporate rule are much the same as those offered for the bankruptcy 
standard.
189
 Essentially, the justification holds that directors rather than the 
courts are charged with management of the business and because of their 
experience and access to information are better able to make business 
decisions.
190
 ―The business judgment rule, therefore, recognizes that courts 
are ill-equipped to second guess the validity of complex business decisions 
                                                                                                                     
 187. Id. 
 188. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986).  
 189. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. 
LAW 1437, 1441 (1985). 
 190. Id.  
21
Korres: Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 Protections Thro
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
980 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
made by directors and officers.‖191 As they were put into effect with the 
same goals and policy concerns in mind, the relevant and applicable part of 
the corporate rule, with respect to bankruptcy application analysis, is when 
it does not apply.  
The corporate business judgment rule is not an absolute rule; instead, it 
contains a series of exceptions under which it does not apply.
192
 For the 
purpose of bankruptcy application, two of the exceptions are of 
considerable importance. The first is that the rule does not apply if the 
plaintiff can show self-dealing, where directors are on both sides of a 
transaction or have a person financial interest in it.
193
  The second is that 
the business judgment rule does not apply when there is any action by a 
board to prevent the effectiveness of a shareholder vote.
194
  
With respect to self-interested transactions, one court stated, ―there is 
no alternative to a judicial evaluation of the fairness of the terms of the 
transaction other than the unacceptable one of leaving shareholders 
unprotected.‖195 However, approval of a transaction by the majority of the 
remaining, disinterested directors is seen as strong evidence that the 
business judgment rule should apply.
196
  
Applied to the bankruptcy law, a similar rationale may be beneficial. If 
self-interest is found on the part of those involved in § 363 sales, the sale 
should be subject to greater Chapter 11 scrutiny. Self-interest would not 
refer to the debtors themselves, who will always be a financially interested 
party to both sides of the deal, but to major creditors whose interest 
extends beyond simply the repayment of their interest through the sale of 
assets. Interest such as creditor involvement in future reorganization 
financing, or substantial control in the affairs of the debtor or newly 
created entity, would be strong evidence  of a self-interested transaction in 
need of greater protections. Additionally, as with the corporate standard, 
approval of the transaction by the majority of the remaining, disinterested 
creditors should be seen as strong evidence that only the business judgment 
rule need apply.  
In regard to actions by the board to prevent the effectiveness of voter 
approval, ―[a]ction designed principally to interfere with the effectiveness 
of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the board and a 
shareholder majority. Judicial review of such action involves a 
determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent towards his 
principal.‖197 Applied to bankruptcy, this standard would essentially 
                                                                                                                     
 191. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND 
DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES §2:12 (rev. online ed. Thomson Reuters 2011).  
 192. See DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 12 (3d ed. 1989) (explaining that, for the 
business judgment rule to apply, directors must be disinterested, exercise due care, act in good faith, 
and not abuse discretion or waste corporate assets).  
 193. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624, 627 (Del. 1984).   
 194. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 (Del. Ch. 1988).  
 195. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).  
 196. E.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988).  
 197. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660.  
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prevent the business justification analysis from applying to § 363 sales in 
which approval by the majority of creditors is seen to be wrongly 
influenced by self-interested creditors to the transaction. Instead, the 
judicial review by bankruptcy courts should involve the legal obligation of 
a debtor to his creditors under Chapter 11 bankruptcy standards.  
As suggested, the Brege and Rose approaches do not separately 
articulate a practical alternative to the business justification analysis. 
However, when combined and included in conjunction with corporate 
limitation principles, they create a practical, tenable alternative to the 
current § 363 standard. This new analytical framework addresses the 
limitations of both the Brege and Rose approaches while preserving the 
discretion of the courts and respecting the time sensitive nature of § 363(b) 
asset sales.   
VI.  REFINING AND COMBINING APPROACHES: A BETTER STANDARD 
The first question under a refined new § 363 analysis is, as proposed by 
Brege, whether the transaction is efficient. If the transaction as proposed is 
efficient, it is mathematically the best possible outcome under the 
circumstances.
198
 Courts should thus liberally and rapidly proceed to 
approval in spite of creditor objections and without a need for lengthy 
further analysis. However, if a transaction is inefficient, it should not 
automatically fail, as Brege suggests.
199
 Such a strict interpretation ignores 
the possibility that inefficient transactions are still necessary to preserve 
businesses and jobs as a matter of public policy. 
Instead, if the transaction is not efficient under the Brege model, the 
absence of efficiency should serve as sufficient cause for added notice 
under the Rose approach.
200
 The lack of efficiency of the transaction 
indicates that the value gained in the § 363 asset sale is actually less than 
would be gained in standard reorganization plans.
201
 Thus, the additional 
delay caused by increasing the notice period would not defeat the 
effectiveness of § 363. The lower immediate sale value under § 363 is a 
strong indicator time is not of the essence. This extended notice need not 
be of considerable duration, instead only long enough for the courts to 
continue on to the additional disclosure considerations under the Rose 
approach.
202
  
Unlike in Rose‘s approach, disclosure analysis should not hinge on a 
balance of the inconvenience to the debtor and the benefit to the objecting 
party.
203
 Instead, as with corporate principles, the courts‘ consideration for 
disclosure should focus on the appearance of self-dealing or manipulation 
of creditor approval. Such consideration still affords the courts limited, but 
not absolute, discretion. Courts are free to determine the amount of 
                                                                                                                     
 198. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1659–73. 
 199. See id. at 1672 (suggesting that if a transaction is inefficient, it should not be pursued). 
 200. See Rose, supra note 86, at 283.  
 201. Brege, supra note 12, at 1659–73.  
 202. See Rose, supra note 86, at 284.  
 203. Id.  
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involvement and influence they are willing to permit before the integrity of 
a transaction is compromised. For transactions in which there is an 
indication of self-dealing or creditor manipulation, courts should require 
additional disclosure  in accordance with Chapter 11 principles. Additional 
factors that the court deems suspect, such as the subrogation of creditor 
rights, could be added to those that prompt greater scrutiny. The additional 
time and scrutiny needed are justified by the potential danger and the 
apparent existence of impropriety and misuse in the § 363 transaction. If 
courts find insufficient self-dealing or manipulation, then no additional 
disclosure or scrutiny requirements are necessary. The standard current 
business justification factors and analysis should then apply as courts 
determine whether non-suspect Brege inefficient transactions are justified 
under the circumstances.
204
 
 
Refined § 363 Review Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See supra Part V.C.  
Objection Defeated: Plan 
Approval 
No 
No additional Disclosure: 
Standard Business Justification 
Heightened Disclosure Req.: 
Ch. 11 Scrutiny  
Objection to § 363 Sale 
Is the Plan Efficient? 
Is there self-dealing or 
creditor manipulations? 
No Yes 
Sufficient Cause Shown 
for Added Notice 
Yes 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/4
2011] BANKRUPTING BANKRUPTCY 983 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The total number of businesses filing for bankruptcy increased by 
nearly 10,000 from 2006 to 2007, and by more than 15,000 from 2007 to 
2008.
205
 As previously stated, of the twenty largest public company 
bankruptcy filings since 1980, seventeen have taken place since 2001, and 
ten of those seventeen were filed between March of 2007 and August of 
2009.
206
 These statistics highlight the eminent importance of bankruptcy 
law, especially with regard to the increasingly pervasive § 363(b) asset 
sales. Whether in this recession or in the future, as these massive 
companies fail, they will turn to § 363(b) to survive. Therefore, 
considering the size and influence of the businesses at stake, ensuring the 
proper application and analysis of § 363(b) sales is imperative. The 
business justification standard as an analytical tool is no longer sufficient 
to prevent the potential misuse of § 363(b) by increasingly knowledgeable 
and desperate debtors and creditors. Courts must adopt a new standard that 
protects the principles of bankruptcy against fraudulent uses of § 363 
without eliminating its essential advantages or restricting the courts‘ ability 
to effectively govern increasingly intricate and unique bankruptcy 
transactions.  
                                                                                                                     
 205. See U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980–2009, supra note 178. 
 206. See 20 Largest Public Company Bankruptcy Filings 1980—Present, supra note 1. 
25
Korres: Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 Protections Thro
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
984 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
 
26
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/4
